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有朋自日本回来

有朋自日本回来,带回了一篇文章。

文章出自日本《朝日新闻》总编辑船桥洋一。尽管发行量不是最大,朝日新闻是日本最好的报纸,立场中间偏自由主义,绝不同于右翼的产经新闻。船桥是日本知名报人和知识分子。日本左派可能是这个地球上最具理想主义的人群,正因如此,船桥这篇文章令友人震惊。

友人是在美韩裔第二代,外交官出身,驻过日本、澳大利亚和中国,会日语和汉语,现常在北京,是真正的日本通、中国通。他说,这次在日本期间,他觉得日本人看中国的态度发生了很大变化。过去日本人看中国,当然有很多疑虑和反感(suspicion and apprehension),但现在加多了愤怒(anger),普遍如此。

谈到中国,他说中国跟美国有一点相似,就是意识不到别人对自己的认知与其自我认知大不同。尽管谈到领土问题时中国人跟所有人一样强硬,绝大多数中国人民天然相信自己是一个热爱和平反对侵略的民族。邻居们对此却没有那么大信心。

朝日新闻总编文章附后,值得一看,特别是友人特地标明的部分:比如,“日本得放弃与中国互利合作关系的幻想。”“如果中国还像这样行事,我们日本人将投入一场与中国的漫长斗争。”

请仔细读一下这篇文章,它是一位日本左翼报人和知识分子与中国的绝交书。与我的友人一样,我认为他错了,但更重要的是绝交事实本身。

友人对我说,他在日本看到,许多平时观点很正常平和自由主义的日本知识分子,在谈到钓鱼岛的时候,就完全变成另外一个人,道理都不讲了。我说,这样的中国人也很多。

民族主义一只巴掌拍不起来,一旦拍起来就很容易进入正反馈,形成共振,悲剧就没有那么远了。

Japan-China relations stand at ground zero

BY YOICHI FUNABASHI

ASAHISHIMBUN EDITOR IN CHIEF

2010/10/09

To my friend in China,

How did you enjoy this year's China National Day?

I attended a party in Tokyo hosted by the Chinese ambassador to mark the occasion. It was a somewhat lonely affair as less than half of the number of Diet members attended compared with last year's party. This was likely due to fallout from the recent row over the Senkaku Islands.

The reason I am writing to you today is because I have serious reservations about the way the Chinese government acted toward Japan  over the incident involving a violation of territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands by a Chinese trawler, and especially, after the boat's captain was arrested.

In Japan, public opinion has been highly critical of the government  led by the Democratic Party of Japan, with its decisions described as "a national disgrace brought about through diplomatic defeat."

Admittedly, many measures taken by the government were half-hearted,  from the lack of any decision by prosecutors to indict the captain to the handling of a Japan Coast Guard video of the collision between the  trawler and two patrol vessels.

One cannot help but conclude that Japan is either still clumsy in its  diplomatic efforts or simply a poor fighter. In comparison, the various measures taken by the Chinese government to apply pressure on  Japan can only be described as a diplomatic "shock and awe" campaign.

However, my take on the incident is as follows:

The captain was arrested by Japanese authorities for allegedly

interfering with the duties of public officials. The incident

demonstrated that Japan had effective control over the Senkaku Islands  by carrying out legal procedures.

In addition, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton clearly stated  that any area under the administrative control of Japan would be covered by Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which  obligates the United States to come to the defense of Japan.

That was a public acknowledgement to the world that the Senkaku

Islands were under the effective control of Japan.

On the other hand, China was able to publicly show to the world that  "a territorial issue" does exist over the Senkaku Islands, in  opposition to Japan repeatedly emphasizing that no territorial issue existed.

Viewed in this way, I believe this contest can be said to have ended in a draw.

Of course, I mean a draw in the sense that Japan and China were even  in the manner in which they both unexpectedly demonstrated how underdeveloped both of their diplomatic efforts were.

This summer when I visited the Shanghai World Expo 2010, I was struck by a visit to the China pavilion.

The panels on display presented a view that China's modern history began in 1979 with the economic reform and open door policy. In other  words, the past 30 years of economic development and the path to becoming an economic superpower were the genesis of modern China.

However, "China's miracle" was made possible by the fact that the  international environment surrounding China was one of peace and stability. There was no mention of that fact in the panels.

That international environment was fostered by the low-profile stance  called for by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (as well as the peaceful rise doctrine that was an extension of that stance) and the  stabilizing power of the Japan-U.S. security alliance.

Including the Senkaku Islands issue, China has recently created tension with a number of neighboring maritime nations. This maritime  issue is the first critical test to the peaceful rise doctrine at its  very roots.

A Chinese friend of mine, a successful entrepreneur, laughed about my  concern and said, "The peaceful rise concept was one that was taken when China's standing was weak."

If that is the case, what will be the principles China employs when it  is in a stronger position?

Would it be the position discussed at the Central Economic Work

Conference held last winter of being "a superpower that does not have  responsibility forced upon it?"

Of the questions I had which I mentioned earlier, the very first  pertains to this point.

The second question I have is about China's maritime views.

If China tries to draw a maritime Maginot line of sorts, by turning  the waters of East Asia into its own "near sea," treating it as surrounding waters and capturing it as a "core interest," it could  lead to gaps within the Asia-Pacific region, which is a maritime  civilization.

At the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi in July, China found  itself isolated as the foreign ministers of 12 nations expressed concerns about Beijing's actions in the South China Sea. One can see this as an expression of the concerns about China's maritime views  held by seafaring Asian nations.

The final question I have concerns the fact that China used economic  cards in its retaliatory diplomacy against Japan.

One example is the virtual ban on exports of rare earth metals to  Japan. Although Beijing denied any such ban had been imposed, there is no doubt that China used economics as a diplomatic tool, be it the rights to gas fields on the seabed of the East China Sea or the safety  of Japanese company employees.

It would be ironic and tragic if the export ban against Japan was the  salute to mark China passing Japan as the world's second biggest economy.

Are the Chinese people aware of the extent to which distrust toward  China was triggered in not only Asia, but in the West as well, over China's indiscriminate economic retaliatory measures?

What is difficult to fathom is why China does not do more to jointly  protect and further foster the "liberal internationalist order" that  has brought so many benefits to China in terms of currency, trade and  maritime interests.

    In your last e-mail, you asked how Japan's views of China would change  in the future.

There are still some uncertainties because the emotions of the people  are still boiling over. However, if China continues to act as it has,we Japanese will be prepared to engage in a long, long struggle with China.

More specifically, it would involve the following:

Relations with China would have as the main objective the pursuit of  practical benefits. That pursuit would remain unchanged.

However, we would have to take inventory of the dreams, ideals and  pursuit of a frontier that Japan held about China after World War II, and especially after diplomatic relations were normalized.

Japan would discard its naivete, lower its expectations, acquire  needed insurance and, in some cases, cut its losses.

China would be treated with respect and moderation. A plain and

ordinary level of exchange would be considered acceptable.

However, Japan would not hold on tothe fantasy of creating a

"mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic

interests."  Japan would be prepared to deal with China with bitter resolve tinged  with a form of resignation.

This would also apply to how Japan relates with Taiwan.

In protest of the captain's arrest, a fishing boat carrying Taiwanese  activists entered the waters near the Senkaku Islands. The Taiwanese government dispatched 12 coast guard ships as an escort.

While the ship had to turn around after being stopped by the Japan  Coast Guard, the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry issued a statement in protest that said, "Japanese ships interfered with the fishing boat  and confronted Taiwan coast guard ships."

The expression of protest against Japan was nothing more than playing  with a political fire. Taiwan is emerging as a new risk factor in the Japan-China relationship.

Last week, I was interviewed by the Japan correspondent for a U.S.  public broadcasting radio network.

The first question she asked was, "For Japan, is the Senkaku shock  bigger than the Nixon shocks?"

She was referring to the shocks in the summer of 1971 when U.S. President Richard Nixon unilaterally declared a normalization of  relations with China (without Japan's knowledge) and stopped gold  convertibility of the dollar (which led to a huge appreciation of the yen).

My reply was, "It will be much bigger."

Problems that arise between Japan and the United States can, in the  end, be resolved within the framework of the alliance. The alliance is the ballast.

However, that cannot be said of the Japan-China relationship.

There is always the danger it will roll completely out of control due  to even the slightest accident.

It was obvious that a mutually beneficial relationship based on common  strategic interests simply did not function.

That was nothing more than rhetoric.

The hot-line between leaders of the two nations also did not operate  at the most crucial moment.

Five years ago when violent anti-Japan protests occurred throughout  China, I offered a pessimistic view of the future of Japan-China  relations.

I remember you chided me by saying that journalists are pessimists by trade.

However, compared to those protests,I feel the hubris of an emerging  superpower out of China now.

A meeting in Brussels between Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Chinese  Premier Wen Jiabao, even if only for 25 minutes, is a first step to  escape the "anomaly" that the Japan-China relationship has entered.

However, Japan and China now stand at ground zero, and the landscape  is a bleak, vast nothingness.

I apologize for any displeasure you may have felt from my letter.

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